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TEXAS LAW AND LEGISLATION

(Vol. I

ALTERNATE JURORS-A REMEDY FOR FELONY
MISTRIALS?

A

MONG the factors impairing the effectiveness of the judicial

process in its role in the administration of criminal justice

is the time-consuming and expensive mistrial. This failure in
judicial operation is attributable in a significant measure to the
death, illness or incapacity of jurors occurring after prosecution
has begun, necessitating retrial with a resultant danger of loss
of evidence due to the death, illness or absence of witnesses. To
whatever extent promptness in the trial and conviction of criminal offenders is thus prevented, the courts become less efficient
as a social agency for the deterrence of crime. Experimentation
in almost a score of jurisdictions with alternate-juror statutes
would seem to afford a simple and practicable device for minimizing the obstructive effect of such unpredictable events;' such statutes generally provide for an alternate or additional juror or
jurors somewhat comparable to "substitute" players in "reserve"
who see and hear all that happens but do not otherwise participate
until one of the "regulars" is removed. Moreover, as a means of
facilitating the uninterrupted conduct of a trial in the event that
a regular juror is excused for cause, this practice has elicited
favorable comment from time to time from members of the Texas
Bar." The alternate-juror development seems especially note1 For earlier treatment of the subject of alternate jurors see Perkins, Proposed Jury
Changes in Criminal Cases (1931) 16 IOWA L. REV. 223; Note (1942) 21 NEB. L. REV.
26; Note (1931) 4So. CALIF. L REV. 303; (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 539; (1936) 11
WASH. L. REV. 109; (1935) 9 U. OF CINrq. L. REV. 307; (1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 122.
See, e.g., the following statement from the Report of the Committee on Criminal
Law and Procedure of The Texas Bar Association: "Within the last 18 months the writer
has had occasion to assist in the prosecution of two capital cases, in each of which
instances a juror was taken sick which resulted in the discharge of the jury and a continuance of the case for the term, at an enormous expense to the taxpayers. We recommend
that a thirteenth juror be impaneled and sworn to sit with his brethren until the time for
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worthy in view of the recent adoption of Federal Rule of Crim.
inal Procedure 24(c), which continues with slight variation the
federal practice begun in 1932 of providing for alternate-jurors.3
The Constitution of Texas provides for "a speedy public trial
by an impartial jury" as a right of the accused in all criminal
prosecutions4 and that "the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate." 5 A further provision specifies that petit juries in the
District Courts shall be composed of twelve men but excepts civil
cases and criminal cases below the grade of felony in both of
which a verdict may be rendered by as few as nine jurors concurring." The Legislature, however, is directed to "pass such laws as
may be needed to regulate" the right of trial by jury and "to
maintain its purity and efficiency"" and from time to time has
passed various statutes determining the method of trial by jury
in criminal cases. Thus it has provided in the Code of Criminal
Procedure that in a felony case the entire jury may be discharged
if one juror is excused after deliberation has commenced' and
their deliberation takes place, when he is excused from further service, provided none of
the 12 jurors have become incapacitated to serve." (1934) 53 Pnoc. TEx. BAR Asso. 160.
162. The recommendation favoring alternate jurors has frequently been made to the
Texas Bar. See (1937) 56 Pnoc. TEx. BAR Asso. 131, 132; (1938) 57 Id. 121, 122:
(1941) 60 Id. 46, 47.
3 The full text of Rule 24(c) is as follows:
"ALTERNATE JURORS: The court may direct that not more than 4 jurors in addition to the regular jury be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate
jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time
the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their
duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same
oath and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities and privileges as the regular
jurors. An alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after
the jury retires to consider its verdict. Each side is entitled to I peremptory challenge in
addition to those otherwise allowed by law if 1 or 2 alternate jurors are to be impanelled,
and 2 peremptory challenges if 3 or 4 alternate jurors are to be impanelled. The additional peremptory challenges may be used against an alternate juror only, and the other
peremptory challenges allowed by these rules may not be used against an alternate
juror."
4 Tr-x. CONST. (1876) Art. I, § 10.
IId., Art. , § 15.
6 Id., Art. V, § 13.
7 Id., Art. I, § 15.
8 TEx. CoD. CraM. Ptoc. (1925) art. 680.
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that not fewer than twelve jurors concurring can render a verdict.' In misdemeanor cases, however, the jury may dwindle to as
few as nine men and still be permitted to render a verdict.1"
In the application of such provisions of the Constitution and
the Code, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a court
has no power to discharge or excuse a juror who has been sworn
in a felony case without discharging the entire panel." This has
been held to be necessary at any stage in the proceeding, even
during the process of selecting jurors, although the language of
the Code"' would seem to provide for discharge of the entire jury
only after retirement. Moreover, the Court has held that such
discharge is mandatory in the absence of waiver by the defend.
ant personally,"3 notwithstanding that the Code provision would
seem merely to be directory. As a result, when sickness or other
cause renders it impossible to proceed with a jury as constituted,
the only course open to the trial court is to organize another one.
The waste of the court's time and the resulting expense to the
state are obvious whenever an entire jury must be thus discharged
after a trial is well in progress.
Since the enactment of the California alternate-juror statute in
1895, provisions designed to reduce the occurrence of mistrials
resulting from the disqualification of jurors have been widely
adopted. Although only twelve states had enacted such a statute
at the time of the approval by the American Law Institute of its
Code of Criminal Procedure in 1931, which embodied provi0 TEx.

CODE CalM. Paoc. (1925) art. 687.
"Id., art. 688.
11 Currasco v. State, 101 Tex. Crim. Rep. 91, 274 S. W. 155 (19251; Crow v. State,
89 Tex. Crim. Rep. 149, 230 S. W. 148 (1921); Sterling v. State, 15 Tex. App. 249
(1883); Ellison v. State, 12 Tex. App. 557 (1882); Hill v. State, 10 Tex. App. 618
(1881). Cf. Hillyard v. State, 116 Tex. Crim. Rep. 567, 34 S. W. t2d 601 (1931);
Adams v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. Rep. 264, 243 S. W. 474 (19221.
12 Tx. CODE CalM. PROC. (1925) art. 680.
13See Sterling v. State and Hill v. State, note 11 supra.
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sions for alternate jurors," seven additional jurisdictions including the federal courts adopted alternate-juror provisions during
the six years following." In general, two types of alternate-juror
statutes have been adopted. Some states have enacted what may
be designated a "substituted-juror" type of statute providing for
twelve regular jurors and one or two alternates, who are substituted in the trial when one or more of the regular jurors are
excused."' The other type, an "eliminated-juror" statute, provides
for a jury consisting of thirteen or fourteen men from the outset
14AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1931) § 285 reads as
follows:
"Alternate jurors. Whenever in tile opinion of the court the trial is likely to be a protracted one, the court may, immediately after the jury is impanelled and sworn, direct
the calling of one or two additional jurors, to be known as 'alternate jurors.' Such jurors
shall be drawn from the same source, and in the same manner, and have the same qualifications as regular jurors, and be subject to examination and challenge as such jurors,
except that each party shall be allowed one peremptory challenge to each alternate juror.
The alternate jurors shall take the proper oath or affirmation and shall be seated near the
regular jurors with equal facilities for seeing and hearing the proceedings in the cause,
and shall attend at all times upon the trial of the cause in company with the regular
jurors. They shall obey all orders and admonitions of the court, and if the regular jurors
are ordered to be kept in the custody of an officer during the trial of the cause, the alternate jurors shall also be kept with the other jurors and, except as hereinafter provided,
shall be discharged upon the final submission of the cause to the jury. If, before the final
submission of the cause, a regular juror dies or is discharged, the court shall order the
alternate juror, if there is but one, to take his place in the jury box. If there are two alternate jurors the court shall select one by lot, who shall then take his place in the jury box.
After an alternate juror is in the jury box he shall be subject to the same rules as a regular juror."
5 See Case J., dissenting in State v. Dolbow, 117 N. J. Law 560, 189 At. 915, 919,
920, 109 A. L. R. 1488, 1494, 1495 (1937), (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 539.
16 The California statute is typical of this variety and is herewith set out in full to
show the procedure in detail.
"[Alternate Jurors: When to be called: Proceduregoverning: Drawing of Alternate.]
Whenever in the opinion of a judge of a superior court about to try a defendant against
whom has been filed any indictment or information for a felony, the trial is likely to be
a protracted one, the court may cause an entry to that effect to be made in the minutes
of the court, and thereupon, immediately after the jury is impanelled and sworn, the
court may direct the calling of one or more additional jurors, in its discretion, to be
known as 'alternate jurors.'
"[Drawing: Qualification: Peremptory challenges.] Such jurors must be drawn from
the same source, and in the same manner, and have the same qualifications as the jurors
already sworn, and be subject to the same examination and challenges; provided that
the prosecution and the defendant shall each be entitled to one peremptory challenge to
such alternate jurors.
"[Seating: Oath: Attendance.] Such alternate jurors shall be seated near, with equal
power and facilities for seeing and hearing the proceedings in the case, and shall take
the same oath as the jurors already selected, and must attend at all times upon the trial
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of the trial until the judge's charge to the jury, at which time a
court official draws lots to determine which twelve of the jurors
will deliberate and render the verdict."
Alternate-juror statutes of both types generally permit the trial
court, in its discretion, to call for additional jurors only if, in the
opinion of the presiding judge, a trial seems likely to be protracted."5 The alternate juror is examined in the same manner as
a regular juror and must have the same qualifications; all per.
sons considered for service as alternate jurors are also subject
of the cause in company with the other jurors; and for a failure so to do are liable to be
punished for contempt.
"[Obedience ol court orders: Confinement: Discharge.] They shall obey the order
of and be bound by the admonition of the court, upon each adjournment of the court;
but if the regular jurors are ordered to be kept in the custody of the sheriff during the
trial of the cause, such alternate jurors shall also be kept in confinement with the other
jurors; and upon final submission of the case to the jury such alternate jurors shall be
kept in the custody of the sheriff and shall not be discharged until the original jurors are
discharged, except as hereinafter provided.
"[Drawing of alternate: Grounds: Substitution.] If at any time, whether before or
after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror die or become ill, so as to be
unable to perform his duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears
therefor, the court may order him to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate,
who shall then take his place in the jury box, and be subject to the same rules and regulations as though he had been selected as one of the original jurors." CAL. PEN. CODS
(Deering, 1941) § 1089.
17 See, e.g., the New Jersey statute, which reads as follows:
"I. Any judge of the court of oyer and terminer, or judge of the court of quarter sessions, before whom a trial shall be commenced, which trial is likely to be protracted, may,
in his discretion, order a jury empanelled not to exceed fourteen members, the members
of which jury shall have the same qualifications and shall be empanelled and sworn in
the same manner as is, or may be, provided by law for the empanelling of juries in such
courts of oyer and terminer and courts of quarter sessions.
"2. All said jurors shall sit and hear said cause. Should any condition arise during
the trial of said cause, which, in the opinion of the trial court, justifies the excusal of any
of the jurors so empanelled from further service, he may do so, and the said trial shall
proceed, unless the number of said jurors be reduced to less than twelve.
"3. In the event there shall be more than twelve jurors left on said jury, after the
charge of the court, the clerk of the court, in the presence of said court, shall place the
names of all of said jurors on slips, folded so as to conceal the names thereon, in a suitable box provided for that purpose by the clerk, and shall draw therefrom twelve names,
the first drawn to act as foreman. The twelve members thus drawn shall then proceed to
determine the issue presented, in the manner provided by law." N. J. ST. ANNUAL (1985)
§§ 53-11a - 53-11c.
15 State v. Heathcoat, 119 N. J. Law 33, 194 Atl. 2,52 (1937) (not reversible error for
judge to impanel only 12 jurors instead of 14).
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to peremptory challenge.19 Statutes provide that the alternate shall
sit "near" or "with" the jury; that he shall hear the entire testimony and see all exhibits; and in some states it is provided that
he may sit with the regular jury after its retirement and listen
to its deliberations but must remain silent and refrain from participating in the verdict. Under a statute with the latter provision
an alternate juror could be available and qualified to substitute
for an excused juror at any time after the opening of the trial
until the final verdict.
The constitutionality of the "substituted-juror" type of statute
was considered by the District Court of Appeal of California in
People v. Peete,2 ' a prosecution for murder. The trial judge, having concluded that the trial would probably be protracted, called
an alternate juror who was seated near the regular jury after
being examined, sworn, and accepted by both sides. After the
trial had progressed for about two weeks, one of the regular jurors
who became ill and was unable to continue was replaced by the
alternate, and the trial proceeded to verdict and sentence. The
defendant attacked the alternate-juror statute as a violation of
the California constitutional guarantee that the right to trial by
jury shall remain inviolate."' The California court stated that the
right of trial by jury is not impaired so long as there are preserved "the essential and substantive attributes or elements of
jury trial"-number, impartiality and unanimity of jurors. The
court held that the alternate-juror statute does not affect "number" inasmuch as a full panel of twelve jurors decides and determines the issues of fact and renders the verdict; that there is no
29 It is possible that no additional peremptory challenge be allowed. The following
alternative provisions for peremptory challenge have been suggested: (1) the prosecution
and defense be each allowed one peremptory challenge to all alternate jurors; (2) the
prosecution be allowed one and the defense two; (3) the prosecution and the defense be
each allowed two such challenges; and (4) each side be allowed one peremptory challenge to each alternate juror. See Perkins, Proposed Jury Changes in Criminal Cases
(1931) 16 IowA L. REv. 223, 237.
29 54 Cal. App. 333, 202 Pac. 51 (1921), Supreme Court hearing denied (1921).
21 California has substantially the same constitutional provision as Texas preserving
inviolable the right of trial by jury. See note 5 supra.
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loss of "impartiality" since the alternate juror hears and sees all
the trial, is subject to the same examination as are regular jurors,
takes the same oath, and the safeguards of impartiality thus
attach to him as well as to all the regular jurors; and finally
that "unanimity" is not sacrificed as all twelve jurors who finally
decide the case must agree unanimously or there is no verdict at
all. The decision of the California court that the constitutional
right of trial by jury is not infringed by a statute permitting the
court to call an additional juror who may later be substituted
for a discharged juror has been followed in later California
decisions and in several other jurisdictions.
The "eliminated-juror" type of statute, providing for the drawing of lots to determine which twelve jurors out of the fourteen
called will render the verdict, was more recently upheld by the
New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals in State v. Dolbow,5
also a felony prosecution. Although in this case no juror was
excused during the course of the trial, defendant alleged that
the statutory procedure violated both the federal constitutional
requirement of due process and the provision providing that the
right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The court said that
the statute was clearly in conformity with the spirit of the constitution and that a contrary holding would prefer form over
2 People v. Lanizan, 22 Cal. (2d) 569, 140 P. (2d) 24 (1943) ; Commonwealth v.
Fugmann, 330 Pa. 4, 198 Atl. 99 (1938) ; People v. Von Badenthal, 8 Cal. App (2d) 404,
48 P. (2d) 82 (1935), (1936) 11 WASH L. REV. 109, (1936) 24 CALIF. L. REV. 735; State
v. Dalton, 206 N. C. 507, 174 S. E. 422 (1934); People v. Tinnin, 136 Cal. App. 301, 28
P. (2d) 951 (1934) ; People v. Mitchell, 266 N. Y. 15, 193 N. E. 445, 96 A. L. R. 791
(1934), (1935) 9 U. OF CINN. L. REV. 307. Cf. People v. Howard, 211 Cal. 322, 295 Pac.
333, 71 A. L. R. 1385 (1930), Note (1931) 4 So. CALIF. L. REV. 303, superseding 289 Pac.
8.30, 70 A. L. R. 182 (1930). In this case the juror disclosed to the court that she had
personal acquaintance with, and prejudice against, some of defendant's witnesses. The
court excused her and substituted an alternate juror. The statute provided for alternates
to be called only in the event that a regular juror became ill or died. The California
Supreme Court held that the statute did not apply but upheld the conviction on the
ground that the substitution was at most only an irregularity which did not substantially
affect the defendant's rights, defendant himself having consented to such substitution.
23 117 N. J. Law 560. 189 Atl. 915, 109 A. L. R. 1488 (1937), (1937) U. OF PA-L. REV.
539, appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 301 U. S. 669 (1937).
Accord: State v. Then, 118 N. J.Law 31, 190 Atl. 495 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ; State v. Augustine, 191 Atl. 805 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
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substance. The court pointed out that there was no injury to the
defendant merely because two potential juroia sat throughout the
trial since they were obligated to participate as regular jurors
until the final designation of those who should ballot.
A third significant decision on the constitutional issues presented by such statutes is Robinson v. United States,"" which sustained the validity of the federal code provision of the substitutedjuror type against the defendant's contention that it amounted to
an invasion of his inviolable right to trial by a jury of twelve
persons. A single alternate, having been selected and seated near
the jury-box, heard and saw all that occurred in the progress of
the trial. When a regular became ill and was excused, defendant's
counsel agreed to substitute the alternate who thereafter sat with
the regular jury and participated in the verdict. The circuit court
of appeals held that no right of the defendant had been violated,
commenting that the alternate-juror statute was forward-looking
legislation and permitted a needed procedural reform."2
The experience of California courts would seem to suggest the
desirability of a provision in alternate-juror statutes that the
alternate should be permitted to sit with the jury following its
retirement and during its deliberations. In two of the earlier
California cases26 it was held that the mere presence of an alternate juror in the jury-room during the deliberations constituted
ground for reversal, notwithstanding that the alternate had been
specially instructed not to express any opinion or to participate
24 144 F. (2d) 392 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944), affd, 324 U. S. 282 (1945) (without discussion ot alternate-juror issue).
-' In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. (2d, 93 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944).
aff'd, U. S. Sup. Ct., June 10, 1946, the circuit court of appeals said that tile purpose of
the alternate-juror statute was remedial and minor irregularities in applying it would
not constitute reversible error.
:6 People v. Britton, 4 Cal. (2d) 622, 52 P. (2d) 217, 102 A. L. R. 1065 (1935),
(1936) 24 CALIF. L. REv. 735 (one alternate in jury-room) ; People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal.
App. (2d) 75, 40 P. (2d) 891 (1935) (two alternates in jury-room).
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by word or action in the deliberations.2 7 Following these decisions, based upon the absence of a statutory provision authorizing attendance by alternate jurors upon the deliberations, the
California statute was amended to permit such attendance. If, as
a practical matter it should be deemed difficult for an alternate
juror to remain silent during discussions extending over a prolonged period, it would perhaps be the better practice to forbid
the alternate from sitting with the jury during the deliberations.
On the other hand, the continuing danger of unexpected illness
of a regular juror would seem sufficiently great to justify attendance by the alternate juror until the balloting has been concluded;
certainly the alternate would be better qualified to substitute for
an excused juror if the alternate had had the opportunity to
hear the discussion that had taken place during the deliberations
prior to his being called in as a regular juror. The advantage of
allowing alternates to sit with the jury in its deliberations would
thus seem considerable whether the procedure be under the substituted-juror or the eliminated-juror type of statute.
The Legislature of Texas is empowered, under the Texas Constitution, to enact either type of alternate-juror statute. The
constitutional provisions which have been unsuccessfully relied
upon in the California, New Jersey and Federal cases by defendants attacking the statutes have been practically identical with
the Texas constitutional provisions. Article 680 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, providing for discharge of the entire jury
in the event that one juror is excused, would be the only statute
which would require revision if an alternate-juror procedure
should be adopted. This article could be made applicable only
in felony cases in which the trial court fails to call an alternate
juror.
27 In People v. Britton, note 26 supra, Curtis and Seawell, JJ., dissenting, stated that
"No possible injury was sustained by the defendant by reason of the presence in the
jury room of the alternate juror during the deliberations of the jury. ... Although it
might be error, as no injury resulted it should not be reversed." One judge had dissented
without opinion in People v. Bruneman, note 26 supra.
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If, however, a provision requiring or permitting the selection
of an alternate juror or jurors in felony- trials is not adopted in
Texas, the risk of abortive mistrials following the excusal of a
juror in the progress of a prosecution could be eliminated by
allowing the jury to be reduced below the common-law number
of twelve. Thus, if only eleven, ten, or even nine jurors should
remain in the panel at the close of the trial, these jurors might
well be permitted to proceed to deliberate and render a verdict,
as may a panel reduced to nine in misdemeanor cases at present. Even if an alternate-juror provision should 'be adopted, a
procedure for continuing felony trials with a diminished panel
would also seem desirable to prevent frustration of the policy of
the alternate-juror measure should the judge inaccurately predict
the duration of a trial and fail to impanel alternate jurors. However, in view of the Texas constitutional provision guaranteeing
the defendant a trial by a jury of twelve men, a constitutional
amendment would be necessary before a felony trial could be
conducted with fewer than twelve jurors.
The alternate-juror procedure operates without unfairness to
the accused; its adoption in Texas would deprive the criminal
defendant of only the undeserved advantages of mistrial, delay
and the possibility of a less vigorous subsequent prosecution or
perhaps none at all. It seems beyond doubt that the interest of
the state in prompt and effective prosecution which would be
served by this procedure can be weighed favorably against the
expense of one or two additional jurors and the time that the
judicial process would devote to their selection. Moreover, such
a procedure should enable trial judges to become more lenient
in excusing jurors for causes other than illness and thus making
jury service less onerous for the hurried business man. Only
slightly more difficult is an evaluation in terms of basic policy
considerations of the proposal for verdicts by juries of fewer
than twelve in felony cases. The issue becomes whether the risk

90

TEXAS LAW AND LEGISLATION

[Vol. 1

of erroneous verdict is significantly greater whea as few as nine
men concur in it than when it is reached by as many as twelve.
If there is appreciably greater risk of error in verdicts by fewer
than twelve, the magnitude of the risk must be compared with
the greater efficiency in judicial administration which would be
realized by reliance upon such verdicts for the elimination of
one cause of mistrials.
Ralph D. Churchill.

